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Summary: The evolution of financial markets and the innovations that technology provides often bring about new threats and 
problems. Consumers often feel that they agreed to unfavourable terms and that only the service provider benefits from the 
contract they signed. This increases the importance of financial consumer protection, including insurance. Hungary was 
among the countries that were not satisfied with following international trends and adopting international solutions, it was one 
of the trailblazers as it independently introduced consumer protection solutions in insurance and finance. We are confident that 
the solutions introduced in Hungary are interesting for other countries, as well. Regulators usually did not choose textbook 
solutions, and they often did not take efforts to put them in a general theoretical context. In retrospect, however, we see a certain 
evolution of the principles and theory of consumer protection solutions in the insurance industry in Hungary. This study aims 
to explore this evolution through actual, specific solutions. Even though this is constructed retrospectively, we believe that to 
be able to move forward, this theoretical reflection is essential, and so is our effort to provide a sort of theoretical foundation 
for consumer protection in the insurance sector in Hungary, and the solutions that have been used to date are useful in this. 
We rely on these as we try to explore the best potential way forward.1
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While it has a lot of benefits, the evolution 
of financial markets often brings about new 
threats and problems, and average consumers 
often feel they agreed to unfavourable terms. 
Just consider the problem of foreign currency 
loans in Hungary, which was exacerbated by 
the 2007–2008 financial crisis and which, as 
many people think, triggered the development 
of financial consumer protection law (Nagy, 
2013). This increases the importance of 
financial consumer protection. By financial 
consumer protection we mean all the solutions 
– primarily rules, institutions and measures – 
used by the state (less frequently by non-state 
entities)2 to ensure that consumers of financial 
services do not suffer any disadvantage while 
using or as a result of using such services. 
Insurance consumer protection is a field within 
financial consumer protection with its specific 
problems, this is the reason why some particular 
solutions are only introduced in this field. 
several international organisations col-
lect and recommend good practices from spe-E-mail address:  jozsef.banyar@uni-corvinus.hu
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cific countries (e.g. World Bank 2012 and 
2017). The European union also creates leg-
islation that is in force in all 28 (27) member 
states. Hungary was among the countries that 
were not satisfied with following international 
trends and adopting international solutions, it 
was one of the trailblazers as it independently 
introduced consumer protection solutions in 
insurance and finance. Regulators usually did 
not choose textbook solutions, and they often 
did not take efforts to put them in a gener-
al theoretical context. In retrospect, however, 
we see a certain evolution of the principles and 
theory of consumer protection solutions in 
the insurance industry in Hungary. This study 
aims to explore this evolution retrospectively, 
through actual, specific solutions. 
We believe that to be able to move forward, 
this theoretical reflection is essential, and so 
our effort is to provide a sort of theoretical 
foundation for insurance consumer protec-
tion in Hungary, and the solutions that have 
been used to date are useful in this. In needs 
to be emphasised that even though this pa-
per does not focus on the consumer protec-
tion oversight processes of the Hungarian Na-
tional Bank (e.g. 2016b and MNB 2015) or 
on the introduction of the activities of the 
Financial Arbitration Board (which is inde-
pendent from the MNB), the activities of 
these bodies are highly significant. The paper 
does not discuss it, but it needs to be noted 
that the MNB provides useful and extreme-
ly widespread information on its website (htt-
ps://www.mnb.hu/fogyasztovedelem) to help 
customers navigate through financial mat-
ters. We will not discuss the consumer pro-
tection activities of other authorities, either, 
even though the Hungarian competition Au-
thority (Gazdasági Versenyhivatal, hereinaf-
ter: GVH) and the National Authority for 
Data Protection and Freedom of Information 
(Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabad-
ság Hatóság, hereinafter: NAIH) – and pre-
viously the data protection supervisor – have 
had major achievements in this field.
overall, we believe that the economic the-
oretical foundations of insurance consumer 
protection and of financial consumer protec-
tion in general are mostly incomplete and un-
derdeveloped. It was only in the past few dec-
ades, as the latest achievements of psychology 
have been integrated into economics, that the 
development of a substantial theoretical back-
ground started, through the inventory of our 
cognitive mistakes (which lead or may lead to 
poor financial decisions). It is the ever devel-
oping field of behavioural economics that may 
provide this theoretical background in the fu-
ture (FcA, 2013; Balogh, 2012; Koltay, Vinc-
ze, 2009; Zavodnyik, 2014).
The paper mostly discusses insurance con-
sumer protection, but whenever possible, we 
will provide an overview of financial consum-
er protection issues, in general. The arguments 
presented in the study are mostly from eco-
nomics. However, this field has considerable 
legal aspects as well, as the findings of eco-
nomics often serve as the basis of legal regu-
lations. We do not provide an overview of the 
legal literature of this topic (it has been done, 
for example by Veres, 2018), and we are aware 
that in legal literature a lot of elements are in-
cluded in consumer protection in addition to 
the ones we discuss – and justifiably so.
THE TaRGET GRoup, mETHoDs 
anD InsTITuTIons of fInanCIal 
ConsumER pRoTECTIon
Retail vs. corporate clients
Historically speaking, the idea that consumers 
(not necessarily only consumers of financial 
products) need to be protected is a relatively 
new development. As mass production 
emerged, the close relationship between 
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customer and producer ceased to exist and for a 
lot of producers, local reputation was no longer 
important. New products were introduced 
to the market in vast numbers, and before 
customers got to know one, it was replaced 
by others. New ‘industries’ emerged, like the 
financial services sector. New developments 
also brought about a change in the situation of 
consumers: unlike for centuries before, now 
they did not have a symmetric relationship 
with producers and service providers, many 
of whom had a much greater economic and 
intellectual (regarding the product or service 
concerned) power. 
Legislation could not keep up with the new 
developments for a long time, as it had not 
really covered consumer problems before. In 
that regard a simple, but for a long time un-
spoken rule, the Latin saying applied: ‘caveat 
emptor’ – let the buyer beware –, which be-
came the formal rule in the late 19th century 
in the united states when consumer problems 
started to multiply (Akerlof, schiller,3 2015).
However, as problems became more and 
more obvious, this principle was applied in a 
narrower scope, differentiating, basically, be-
tween two groups of consumers. on the one 
hand, those that were still assumed to be in 
a symmetric position with large economic or-
ganisations (organisations themselves and their 
wealthy owners), while, on the other hand, 
those in an obviously different situation (‘or-
dinary’ customers and very small companies) 
– from then on there was a differentiation be-
tween ‘corporate’ and ‘retail’. Retail custom-
ers find it difficult to gather information and 
they are considered non-professionals in most 
fields. This phenomenon is often called ‘infor-
mation asymmetry’ – this term was also intro-
duced by Akerlof (Akerlof, 1970), and Vincze 
(2010) reviewed the relevant literature from a 
consumer protection aspect. Retail customers 
are usually the weaker parties in transactions, 
so they need protection.4
Methods and institutions of  financial 
consumer protection
The most important key tool of financial (and 
other) consumer protection is the creation of 
legislation that protects retail consumers. The 
so-called protectionist theory (see for example 
czajlik, Horváth, Pap, 2012) is based on the 
assumption, that consumers are in fact victims 
of the free market, in need of active protection 
from the government through all available 
legal means.
If the consumer feels that the financial ser-
vice provider infringed the regulations, they 
can seek legal remedy, mostly in court. Here, 
again, we see an asymmetric situation as con-
sumers are (usually) not aware of the legal reg-
ulations providing protection to them (as op-
posed to the service provider). usually a lawyer 
is needed, and finding, hiring one takes time 
and money, meaning the entry cost/transac-
tion cost is high (coase, 1990). 
This makes compliance with legal regula-
tions crucial, and also monitoring compliance 
by the financial supervisory authority, which, 
in Hungary, usually closely follows the latest 
international trends. 3 separate supervisory au-
thorities were established shortly before the po-
litical transition.5 These were soon followed by 
the fourth supervisory authority, according to 
Act XcVI of 1993 on Voluntary Mutual Insur-
ance Funds. on 1 April 2000, pursuant to Act 
cXXIV of 1999 on the Hungarian Financial 
supervisory Authority and following the estab-
lishment of Britain’s Financial services Author-
ity (hereinafter: FsA), which set an interna-
tional example. The 4 (3) separate Hungarian 
supervisory authorities mentioned before were 
merged into one and the Hungarian Financial 
supervisory Authority (Pénzügyi szervezetek 
Állami Felügyelete, hereinafter: PsZÁF) was 
established. This, again following the recent 
English example6, the PsZÁF was merged into 
the central bank of Hungary, MNB from 1 oc-
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tober 2013, pursuant to Act cXXXIX of 2013 
on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. Here, howev-
er, there was an important and for us relevant 
difference from the English example (which 
itself followed a previous  Australian, etc. 
example), as the FsA was divided into two 
supervisory authorities, one for prudential 
regulation and one for market conduct (con-
sumer protection, basically), and the latter was 
(remained) independent. one reason for this 
is that the consumer protection duties of su-
pervisory authorities increased, and another 
reason is that prudential and consumer protec-
tion goals may clash sometimes, and it’s best 
if these different interests are represented by 
separate authorities. With this, a new model 
for financial supervision was created.7
At first, legislation on consumer protection 
focused only on contractual terms. changes 
started when more detailed regulatory provi-
sions were introduced in consumer protection 
legislation regarding market behaviour, as well 
(e.g. provision of information). Monitoring 
compliance with these required considerably 
larger resources and the methodology was also 
different from that of prudential supervision. 
This was the rise of financial consumer pro-
tection oversight by the supervisory authori-
ty, which started only in the 2000s, or mostly 
in this decade.
The methodology of consumer protection 
oversight by financial supervisory authorities 
is being developed right now internationally, 
it is far from being complete and it is not suit-
able for individual cases, for solving individu-
al problems. This led to the evolution of court-
like institutions around the world that actually 
supplement the court system, and are availa-
ble to the customers easily and at a low cost: 
These include financial ombudsman and arbi-
tral tribunal. It was the latter model that Hun-
gary adopted in 2011, when, pursuant to Act 
cLVIII of 2010 on the Hungarian Financial 
supervisory Authority, the Financial Arbitra-
tion Board (Pénzügyi Békéltető Testület, here-
inafter: PBT) was established, which operates 
with relative independence besides the PsZÁF 
and the MNB.
The PBT provides a convenient solution to 
consumers, as they do not need to hire a law-
yer or pore over legal books; it is enough if 
they describe, in their own words, the prob-
lem with the procedure of the financial organ-
isation.
THE EsTablIsHmEnT of (lEGal) 
REGulaTIons pRoTECTInG 
InsuRanCE ConsumERs, anD THEIR 
EvoluTIon In HunGaRy
Legal regulations and supervisory recommen-
dations protecting the clients of insurance 
companies came in the following chronological 
order, following a sort of internal, implicit 
logic:
•	compensating for the dominance of the 
insurance company,
•	compensation for the information asym-
metry, which is detrimental to the user,
•	correcting previous approaches by taking 
into consideration the limited cognitive 
capacity,
•	and dealing with conflicts of interests.
Compensating for dominance
The first efforts to tackle with the insurance 
companies’ dominant position (and here we 
use the general meaning of the term not its 
specific meaning in competition law) involved 
prescribing asymmetric contractual terms that 
were more beneficial for the consumers.8 This 
legal solution is also called limping obligation.9 
An example for this is the ‘cooling off’ period 
in life insurance, which was introduced a few 
years ago.10
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Monitoring compliance with such rules was 
simple. During the period of insurance mo-
nopoly, before 1986, the General Terms and 
conditions of life insurance agreements were 
issued by the Ministry of Finance, which in-
cluded the relevant provisions of the previous 
civil code, including the provisions on asym-
metric termination. After the end of the in-
surance monopoly and the concurrent estab-
lishment of the state Insurance supervisory 
Authority, insurance companies could launch 
new insurance products only after a stringent 
product authorisation process. Product au-
thorisation was abolished at the end of the 
1990s, but the examination of product terms 
became a routine part of the audits of the su-
pervisory authority.
Why life insurance?
Within insurances, it was first the clients/
consumers of life insurance agreements that 
were protected. It is clear that even later on 
a disproportionate part of new regulations 
applied to this segment, which may be seen as a 
regulatory ‘asymmetry’ of some sort. The reason 
for this is that, as opposed to ordinary, frequently 
purchased goods like car or home insurance, life 
insurances are ‘experience goods’ not ‘search goods’ 
(Nelson, 1970). These categories are often used 
for a justification of consumer protection in case 
of ‘experience goods’ and ‘credence goods’. 
We buy experience goods infrequently, we 
find it difficult to navigate among them; here 
we cannot learn by trial and error as we do 
with low value, frequently purchased search 
goods. In case of high value, rarely purchased 
goods and services, the probability of a non-
professional customer making a good choice 
when committing their significant funds in 
the long term must be maximised. consum-
ers need help in this, so that they will not buy 
a service (e.g. life insurance) that is optimal 
for the insurance company or the intermedi-
ary, not for themselves.
The problem (and consequences) of cus-
tomer learning was not realised earlier, but 
one element of it was, namely the information 
asymmetry between insurance companies and 
consumers, and compensation methods were 
devised.
Compensating for information 
asymmetry
Change in the potential focus  
of the Hungarian insurance market  
and consumer protection
In Hungary, the competitive insurance market 
developed at the time of the political transition, 
when several large western, multinational 
insurance companies established subsidiaries 
in Hungary. The first competitive insurance 
market was the market of compulsory 
insurance for civil liability in respect of motor 
vehicles in the summer of 1991, and soon after 
it was followed by the life insurance segment. 
In the life insurance segment, companies were 
competing for customers on many levels, but, 
in a seemingly paradoxical way, it did not 
result in a decrease in prices (Banyár, Regős, 
2012). The premium competition that started 
did not necessarily bring about a decrease 
in the cost part, i.e. prices, as with a high 
technical interest rate, it was easy to achieve 
low premiums with a high cost part (Banyár, 
Vékás, 2016). overall, despite the strong 
premium competition in this period, the cost 
part of life insurance products on the market 
increased significantly compared to the costs 
applied by the state Insurance company when 
it had a monopoly (for calculations on the cost 
part of life insurances, see Banyár, 2013).
It also contributed to the increase in costs 
that customers bought life insurance prod-
ucts from the insurance company they felt was 
‘the coolest’, and they ‘measured’ this by the 
companies’ advertisements and agents. Well-
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dressed, expert agents did not come cheap, 
as they decided which insurance company to 
choose based on remuneration, which was an-
other factor that contributed to the increase in 
the cost part of insurances.
Insurance companies tried to hide costs 
with increasingly complex product structures, 
and they went back to their previous tactics 
and tried to change their products in specific 
points in such a way that it could not be com-
pared to the products of competitors, since 
‘sellers have a strong incentive to offer multidi-
mensional products, and to adopt multidimen-
sional pricing schemes’ (Bar-Gill, 2008).
Looking for solutions
These developments also explain how the 
consumer protection approach got to a new 
level and why it happened primarily in life 
insurance. Regulators at the time believed 
that when customers buy products at high 
costs and with unfavourable terms, they 
basically lack sufficient information, i.e. the 
previously mentioned information asymmetry 
occurs. This means customers need more 
information to make informed decisions, so 
companies were required to provide more 
and more information to their clients, and 
the transparency of certain information was 
also required. This was in line with the view 
that customers sign suboptimal contracts 
of their own free will if they are unaware of 
key features of the product they purchase 
or if they are unaware of the interests of the 
intermediary. In theory, a third option is also 
possible, namely that the intermediary also 
has insufficient information and as a result 
recommends inadequate products to the 
customers. 
The ‘Agent register’
starting with this latter problem: It needed to 
be ensured that only insurance intermediaries 
with adequate knowledge pursue insurance 
intermediation activities, the possibility 
that some shortcoming in an intermediary’s 
qualifications has a detrimental effect on 
the consumer needed to be eliminated. For 
this, qualification (and minimum levels of 
education) requirements needed to be set. To 
be able to control this, it was useful to make 
a list of intermediaries: Before that, no-one 
ever knew how many people were actually 
active as intermediaries on the insurance 
market in Hungary. Eventually, the solution 
was the Agent register, which the Hungarian 
supervisory authority started to plan in 2001, 
and it was launched as a public online plat-
form in 2004. 
However, the option that customers now 
had, i.e. to check in the register if intermedi-
aries that contacted them were really acting on 
behalf of the financial company they said they 
were (also emphasised in the Eu regulation) 
was merely a theoretical option for an abstract 
problem.11 The real benefit of the register for 
the customers was that uniform requirements 
were set regarding qualifications. It was part-
ly to protect the clients, but even more im-
portantly to help reduce the number of in-
termediaries, which had increased too much 
and had undermined the market opportuni-
ties of the intermediaries, who could hardly 
find a prospective client that had not been vis-
ited by 5 different agents of the competitors 
before. As a result, the time and energy neces-
sary for concluding one deal increased, which 
led to intermediaries asking for higher com-
missions, which led to an increasing cost part 
in the life insurance premiums. The qualifica-
tion requirements were also meant to reduce 
this cost pressure. 
In summary, registration and qualification 
requirements are important, but they did not 
solve the consumers’ problems stemming from 
the (opposing) interests of intermediaries, and 
probably these were not the best tools to tack-
le this problem. 
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The interests of the agent – Debates over the 
transparency of commissions
Many clients do not take out a life insurance 
policy that serves their interest the best, 
because intermediaries push them to choose 
the insurance product for which they, the 
intermediaries, receive the highest commission. 
This means there is a conflict of interest between 
the client and the insurance intermediary, and 
the client is usually not aware of this as the 
intermediary is usually paid by the insurance 
company (from the money it receives from the 
client), and the client is not aware of, and at 
this stage cannot be aware of the amount of 
the commission. As a radical solution to the 
problem, it has come up from time to time 
that the intermediary should be paid directly 
by the client, but, at first, with no international 
example, no decision-maker dared to take this 
step. It is true, logically, that the fact that 
the intermediary is paid by the party with 
opposing interests, i.e. the insurance company, 
and not the actual client is only a problem 
in the case of independent intermediaries 
representing the client. (It is rare that it can be 
proved that the intermediary, acting on behalf 
of the client, works for their own benefit, not 
for the benefit of the client. The Hungarian 
competition Authority revealed such a case in 
2005.)12 And there has been a counterexample, 
too: In case of intermediaries acting on behalf 
of large companies, it was widespread both 
in Hungary and abroad that intermediaries 
were paid directly by the client to manage this 
issue of conflicting interests. Large companies 
realised and handled this problem, since they 
knew that insurance companies paid the 
intermediaries from their money even when 
they did not know how much. 
smaller companies and retail clients, how-
ever, would be less willing to pay twice for the 
same insurance: The insurance premium to the 
insurance company and the commission to the 
intermediary, so there is some theoretical ba-
sis for insurance companies to pay the com-
mission for retail customers, even in the case 
of independent intermediaries. on the oth-
er hand, it was not justified at all that clients 
should not know how much of the premium 
goes to the intermediary, especially to the inde-
pendent intermediary representing their inter-
ests. If, however, independent intermediaries 
must reveal their commission, dependent ones 
must, too, otherwise the former cannot survive 
on the retail market, and this was not the goal.
Because of all this, throughout most of the 
decade the debate was over the transparency of 
commissions, not about intermediaries being 
paid by the clients directly. This means that 
the attempts to solve the inherent conflict of 
interest (would have) involved dealing with in-
formation asymmetry.
Naturally, insurance companies and inter-
mediaries resisted transparency, presenting 
two kinds of arguments:
•	essential and
•	technical.
Essential arguments said the demand was 
nonsensical, as there is not a single industry 
where it is mandatory to provide information 
on the elements of the price, so no such re-
quirement can be imposed in the insurance 
sector, either. This argument confused the pro-
ponents of transparency for a long time, then 
we realised that the insurance premium is not 
the price of the insurance service, that is only 
the cost part of the insurance as a service, so its 
disclosure to the public is justified. This, how-
ever, is higher than the commission, which is 
only a part of it – in fact a large part, in Hun-
gary about 50 percent. This also means that 
total cost transparency is more substantiated 
than the transparency of commissions only 
(for this, see Banyár, Vékás 2016).
Technical arguments said that it was easy for 
insurance companies to circumvent this: There 
is room for ‘tricks’, and instead of paying cer-
tain amount as commission, they can pay a 
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large part of it as support for office rental, ed-
ucation contribution, etc., this way the com-
mission reported is low, but not real. overall 
this argument also supported total cost trans-
parency over commission transparency, as the 
former is more difficult to circumvent, and if 
it leads to a decrease in total costs, it does not 
matter what percent of that is paid by the in-
surance company as commission.
The idea of commission transparency was 
discarded eventually, but the idea of cost trans-
parency was developed. In retrospect, how-
ever, it is interesting that we were trying to 
handle conflicts of interests by providing in-
formation. This would not have worked, prob-
ably, as shown by subsequent experiences with 
the cost indicator.
However, it was not only the commission 
that we wanted to make public to deal with 
conflicts of interests. Another such require-
ment is that intermediaries should provide 
information as to who exactly they represent 
(e.g. the agent represents the insurance com-
pany). Experience in the us shows that such 
regulations have the opposite effect: From that 
point on, the agent feels free to represent their 
own interests over the interests of the client 
even more (cain et. al., 2005, quoted by Ar-
iely, 2012).
Product information – Suggesting cost 
transparency
Product information is varied as life insurance 
products are varied, too, and it is clear that 
clients find it hard to navigate through product 
terms that include this information. clients 
cannot differentiate between important and 
less important information, and product terms 
contain a lot of specialist terms that they have 
never seen before, so there is a chance they will 
not understand them. Terms and conditions, 
however, are defined precisely for a reason: In 
court proceedings, clear language is essential, 
no matter whether the client understands 
it or not. This means there is a seemingly 
insoluble contradiction between the natural 
self-defence reflex of the insurance company 
and between providing information to clients. 
Internationally, and also in Hungary, the 
solution that was agreed on was to require an 
easy-to-understand summary of terms and 
conditions, i.e. to highlight the key parts. In 
addition to this, in Hungary, we also required 
a much more detailed product description, 
but as this takes us to the next stage of the 
solution, we will discuss it there.
As we have seen, arguments over making 
commissions public also led to the conclusion 
that it was costs that needed to be made public. 
But how? In a typical life insurance contract 
there are several cost elements, and the calcula-
tion of each of them is based on various prin-
ciples. If insurance companies were required 
to disclose every cost element they charge to 
the client, the client could probably do noth-
ing with this pile of information. This need-
ed to be made more compact, which led to the 
idea that costs should be presented as a kind of 
internal rate of return, or as the difference be-
tween the internal rate of return calculated for 
net premium and the actual internal rate of re-
turn, as clients understand the concept of in-
terest rate margin. It must be pointed out that 
at this time there was no such cost indicator 
in any financial sector internationally. In 2007, 
the supervisory authority issued a recommen-
dation (PsZÁF 2007) for insurance compa-
nies and independent insurance intermediaries 
regarding the introduction of a cost indica-
tor (described in detail in the recommenda-
tion) for life and savings insurance products. 
The professional community reacted to the 
recommendation after 2 years; in a self-regu-
latory manner, coordinated by the Association 
of Hungarian Insurance companies (Magyar 
Biztosítók szövetsége, hereinafter: MABIsZ), 
they introduced the Total cost Indicator (here-
inafter: TcI) for unit-linked insurance prod-
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ucts only, and every Hungarian insurance com-
pany selling life insurance products voluntarily 
agreed to use it (MABIsZ 2009).13
The expected result of the cost indica-
tor was that clients would not be willing to 
buy insurance above a certain cost, meaning 
the costs of insurance companies will be lim-
ited, which will limit the specific costs, in-
cluding the commission. Experience showed, 
however, that it did not work this way. cli-
ents are willing to buy life insurance products 
with very high TcI (over 10 percent) if this 
is what the intermediary recommends. Expe-
rience revealed a very different mode of action 
of cost decrease, which was twofold. on the 
one hand, product developers were now less 
likely to launch products with high TcI, and 
on the other hand, some intermediaries sell-
ing products with lower TcI than the compet-
itors informed the clients about this, and as a 
result the agents of the competitors started to 
demand low TcI products from their product 
developers. As a result, products with extreme-
ly high TcI disappeared from the Hungarian 
insurance market very soon.
The problem of the concrete solution
In retrospect we can say that measures to 
eliminate information asymmetry were useful 
and positive, but three important problems 
need to be mentioned in this context:
uas new information obligations were in-
troduced, legal regulations stipulated that cli-
ents must sign the documents, acknowledg-
ing they were provided information before 
the conclusion of the insurance contract. This 
means, however, that if the client makes a com-
plaint, the insurance company can immediate-
ly prove that information was provided, which 
immediately puts the client at a disadvantage as 
compared to the insurance company;
vit is obvious that the more information 
insurance companies are required to provide 
to their clients, the longer the process of con-
cluding a contract is, which leads to an in-
crease in administrative tasks, makes con-
tracting and thus the insurance product more 
expensive, and this additional cost will eventu-
ally be paid by the clients.
wfinally, as more and more facts and data 
are compulsorily provided, it will become un-
productive after a while, as clients are over-
whelmed by the information. This means that 
above a certain level, it may become counter-
productive, and clients cannot focus on key 
information.
With the most important piece of informa-
tion, the cost indicator, this was avoided, and 
this leads us to another path, one we gradually 
moved on to. one of the key solutions of this 
other path was the cost indicator.
Correction: Taking limited cognitive 
capacity into consideration
This shift was gradual and careful. It became 
more and more obvious that too much 
information is (almost) as harmful as too little. 
You can hide behind information overflow 
and you can use it to confuse clients. Even 
though we did not realise it theoretically at the 
time, in retrospect we can say that the start-
ing point of the theory, the image of the homo 
eoconomicus in microeconomics was not correct. 
This assumes that everyone has an almost 
infinite capacity for analysis. We gradually 
realised that this was not true. Thanks to Da-
niel Kahneman’s (Kahneman, 2011) research 
of the use of cognitive systems, we now have 
the theoretical basis. Kahneman differentiates 
between two systems:
system u: fast, works without effort. Here 
we make instinctive choices, basically, using 
simple rules of thumb,
system v: slow and energy-consuming. 
This is our logical thinking, and we use it less 
frequently than microeconomics assumes.
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The conclusion is that we are easy to manip-
ulate, we are not ‘econs’ but ‘humans’ (terms 
used by Thaler and sunstein, 2008). However, 
when limited cognitive capacity is taken into 
consideration, we can picture two consumer 
protection strategies:
uwe should try to activate the ‘lazy’ sys-
tem 2, or
vthe process must be simplified to a level 
where we can make good decisions even with 
the simple system 1. 
Even at first glance, it seems probable that 
it is the second strategy we can expect visible 
results from, but we first tried the first strate-
gy, in line with international trends. This can 
be interpreted as a kind of rearguard action to 
protect the notion of homo eoconomicus. 
Trying to activate system 2
As the operation of system 2 requires time 
(and effort), it is logical to try to slow down 
and divide the process of contracting into 
parts, providing a schedule to the client, 
pointing out the important elements of the 
insurance product so that they will focus their 
valuable mental resources there. In Hunga-
ry, the regulatory solution for this was the 
compulsory needs assessment and product 
information, introduced in life insurance in 
the mid-2000s (PsZÁF 2006). This stipulates 
that before a life insurance policy is taken out, 
there must be a needs assessment exploring and 
recording the important circumstances of the 
client, and the insurance company must refer 
to this when recommending a life insurance 
product, and it must provide the client with 
written product information that includes the 
parameters of that product.
It is easy to see that if insurance companies 
launch complicated products (which they try 
to do, logically), the effects of this strategy may 
be limited, just like the effects of educating 
clients.
The education of clients can be seen as 
the solution of this strategy on a non-regula-
tory level. From the early 2000s, the super-
visory authority published brief, colourful 
booklets about several product types from 
different financial areas to provide informa-
tion to the clients (Financial Navigator Book-
lets: https://www.mnb.hu/fogyasztovedelem/ 
penzugyi-navigator-fuzetek). These booklets 
were available through the customer services 
of financial institutions. The MNB supports 
the Pénziránytű Alapítvány (https://penzirany 
tu.hu/), a foundation that develops trainings 
and coursebooks to improve financial aware-
ness (szebelédi, 2019).
These are useful supplements that some-
times help certain groups of clients, but their 
full impact will only be seen decades later. Yet 
it seems that educating clients and spreading 
‘financial literacy’ has become one of the most 
important consumer protection approach-
es of the decade (oEcD, 2011, Atkinson, 
Messy, 2012 and Lusardi, Mitchell, 2011), 
and various financial industries embraced 
this solution (see for example Insurance Eu-
rope 2017). We, however, have an uneasy 
feeling about this: It seems as if they are do-
ing this to divert regulators from the more 
important areas of consumer protection. 
spreading financial literacy is indeed impor-
tant, but it probably will not have tangible 
results in the coming decades, which means 
if financial industries take very visible steps in 
this area, they can avoid implementing sub-
stantial changes for a long time.
We believe that the second option, the 
strategy of simplification is much more im-
portant.
Simplifying information
The elements stemming from this strategy, in 
retrospect, were present in previous solutions, 
but this time it was not in Hungary but in 
the Eu that they were defined in relation 
to Packaged Retail and Insurance-Based 
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Investment Products (PRIIPs). (Haraszti et. 
al., 2017, and Lencsés, Paál, 2015) 
The PRIIPs regulation stipulates that cli-
ents must be provided with consolidated and 
simplified information on packaged retail in-
vestment products. The products are basical-
ly from 3 financial sectors: banking, securities 
and insurance. Basic requirements:
ua product summary, the so-called ‘Key 
Information Document’ (KID) must be drawn 
up about the key product features and product 
terms in a standardised, no more than 3-page-
long summary using clear and understandable 
language,
vthe risks of the product must be summa-
rised in a comparable manner, using simple 
risk indicators,
wthe costs of the product must be present-
ed in a standardised manner with cost indica-
tors that allow for comparison.
Here, again, the essence of the strategy is 
to provide information, but, as opposed to 
the simple strategy of eliminating information 
asymmetry, here it is the quality and not the 
quantity of the information that is important. 
This means the key elements of the strategy 
are searching for and identifying key informa-
tion and drawing up brief and comprehensible 
documents so that clients can make a decision 
using system 1.
However, experience with TcI in Hungary, 
which was introduced much earlier than PRI-
IPs, shows that even TcI is not simple enough 
for most people to make the right decision. 
Positive experience with TcI suggests a mode 
of action very different from what was ex-
pected from the PRIIPs. This implies that we 
should continue in this direction. Moreover, 
it can also be established that the provision of 
information is not suitable for effectively han-
dling market failure that results from conflicts 
of interest and that is eventually paid for by 
the consumers, so other methods are needed 
for that, too.
Dealing with conflicts of  interest  
and market failures
Experience shows that cost transparency only 
decreases the costs (and thus the ‘price’) of 
financial products because it eliminates the 
products with extremely high costs from the 
market. But when the available products are 
similar as far as costs are concerned, clients 
have nothing to rely on to assess what is high 
and what is low. An analysis of the price of 
Hungarian life and savings insurances reveals 
that they are high (Banyár, 2013). The reason 
for this is the high number of cancellations, as 
the insurance intermediary is fundamentally 
interested in the conclusion of the insurance 
contract, not in its long-term existence, as the 
key part of the compensation of insurance 
intermediaries in Hungary is customer 
acquisition commission, the proportion of the 
ongoing commission is much smaller. This is 
a result of the high turnover of intermediaries, 
i.e. many people see their career as an insurance 
intermediary as a short-term and involuntary 
detour, and they cannot wait until they have 
brokered enough insurance policies to live on 
ongoing commissions. As a result, for them it 
is not worth investing too much in this activity 
(acquiring knowledge, building a reputation), 
and this leads to a situation where it is in 
the interest of a large number of insurance 
intermediaries to broker agreements, that are 
not beneficial for the clients in the long term, 
and this is a problem that cannot be solved by 
providing information.
Another problem is that without active per-
suasion by the intermediaries, clients, of their 
own volition, would not take out a signifi-
cant part of their insurance policies in the first 
place. These efforts taken by insurance inter-
mediaries, including the many unsuccessful 
ones, are eventually paid for by the clients who 
were persuaded to take out life insurance pol-
icies. From the insurance companies compet-
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ing for customers the winner will be the one 
that attracts the most insurance intermediaries 
with good performance. The size of the com-
mission is a major factor in this. This led to a 
paradoxical phenomenon where competition 
for clients on the life insurance market is pri-
marily a direct competition for insurance in-
termediaries through increasing commissions 
and thus increasing prices, not the other way 
round (Banyár, Regős, 2012).
The MNB realised this when in 2014 it 
recommended, at first for pension insuranc-
es (which were introduced that year with a 
reduced tax rate to promote them), that a 
maximum value should be set for the TcI 
(MNB, 2014, and Banyár, Nagy, szebelédi, 
Windisch, Zubor, 2014), then it was expand-
ed to all life and savings insurances (MNB, 
2016a). The ‘Ethical Life Insurance’ recom-
mendations in 2016 also included spread-
ing the commission, and this was strength-
ened by setting a minimum surrender value. 
The aim of this is to make the customer ac-
quisition commission less and less dominant, 
making it worth for insurance intermediar-
ies to think in the long term. All this togeth-
er means that commissions decrease, and as 
a result the market can sustain fewer insur-
ance intermediaries. on the other hand, peo-
ple choosing this profession will find that it is 
worth thinking in the long term and invest-
ing in their training and reputation. Meas-
ures to increase entry barriers (e.g. raising 
qualification requirements) also contribute 
to this, as they help decrease the pressure to 
increase the costs of insurance. 
Developments in international regulation, 
e.g. tightening the Insurance Mediation Di-
rective (hereinafter: IMD), i.e. the implemen-
tation of the IDD (Insurance Distribution 
Directive) (2016) also work in this direction 
(Lencsés, 2016).
However, it is clear that dealing directly 
with conflicts of interest still has a potential 
as a consumer protection strategy, especially in 
insurance products other than life insurance.
fuTuRE oppoRTunITIEs
One potential path: Taking limited 
cognitive capacity into consideration
As for the future, considering the above, we 
can say that it is not necessarily true that only 
information needs to be simplified, and it is 
not necessarily possible to sufficiently simplify 
information. It is in the interest of insurance 
companies and other financial service providers 
to develop more and more complex insurance 
products. customer satisfaction is not their 
only motivation in this (while, of course, this 
is what they emphasise), but they also try to 
hide their costs and try to make comparison 
between their products and their competitors’ 
products more difficult and to achieve some 
kind of relative monopoly. This means 
complexity and diversity is not necessarily good 
for the client (schwartz, 2004). While most 
areas of insurance are mature markets where 
clients should not face surprises. 150 years ago 
there was a competition between alternating 
current and direct current, and different ser-
vice providers had different voltage. We do 
not have this competition now, it has become 
pointless, even though it could have persisted, 
but it is better for the clients that there is a 
state standard that suits almost all cases, and 
special demands are treated separately. This 
means standardisation is justified on a mature 
market. Not only information, but choices 
and products could be simplified as well.
The simplification of choices already has its 
own theoretical literature (Thaler, sunstein, 
2008). According to this, regulators as ‘choice 
architects’ must, in a ‘libertarian paternalis-
tic’ approach, provide good defaults for the 
most important choices, including the selec-
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tion of financial products, insurance products 
and their parameters, so that if clients simply 
rely on these defaults, they are highly likely to 
make good decisions.
To make this possible, it is best to simpli-
fy the available products themselves (naturally 
only on the retail insurance market), and there 
are at least two possible phases for this:
uthe standardisation of product terms 
in the market within specific retail product 
groups (e.g. home insurance, term life insur-
ance, comprehensive motor own damage in-
surance, etc.),
vdefining a basic product or basic product 
package within these product groups.
There are different potential degrees of 
product standardisation. In the lightest ver-
sion, only the structure of the terms and con-
ditions is set, i.e. the specific provisions have 
a set order. This is to make it easier for clients 
to compare similar products of different insur-
ance companies, as they can find what they are 
interested in the same section in all terms and 
conditions. It also makes the work of product 
comparison sites easier, which increases com-
petition among insurance companies. Before 
it was merged into the MNB, PsZÁF was ex-
perimenting with this approach, and at its re-
quest MABIsZ created the standard Product 
sheet for home insurance products (MABIsZ, 
2013), and every Hungarian home insurance 
provider joined voluntarily. Their first under-
taking was rather moderate: The terms and 
conditions of any new home insurance prod-
uct in the future must follow the structure of 
the standard product sheet.14 Nowadays there 
is a similar MNB initiative regarding the terms 
and conditions of so-called consumer-friend-
ly products.
Another degree of standardisation is when 
certain key concepts have a common defini-
tion, and the highest degree is when the same 
terms and conditions are used on the whole 
market. An existing example of standardised 
product terms is compulsory insurance for civ-
il liability in respect of motor vehicles, and it 
is not a coincidence that despite some recent 
decline this is still the most competitive insur-
ance submarket in Hungary.
standardisation would provide an oppor-
tunity to make the financial literacy strate-
gy effective, as it would provide clients with 
a comprehensible amount of information that 
would also be detailed enough. 
However, the second solution, i.e. defin-
ing basic products, would help choice plan-
ning and setting defaults more. This would 
mean that as opposed to the standardisation of 
General Terms and conditions on the market, 
there would be a basic product in every retail 
product group that is simple, that covers the 
most common needs and that is uniform on 
the whole market. The state could encourage 
this with providing tax reductions specifically 
for the basic products.
Another potential path: Dealing with 
conflicts of  interest and market failures
Knowing that one of the strategies insurance 
companies use to decrease competition and 
increase prices is to bundle different basic 
insurance services in one product package, it 
is a logical step to implement an unbundling 
strategy to deal with this. This unbundling 
strategy has been successfully used for network 
products (e.g. electricity) as a means to 
increase competition. In this case it meant the 
separation of the electricity provider and the 
network, i.e. the accessibility of the networks 
for other electricity providers, which eliminated 
local monopolies. In a broader sense, from the 
aspect of the client, this means the separation 
of electricity and the transport of electricity 
as a service. Applying it for insurance, the 
mandatory unbundling of insurance packages 
would allow clients to select the best offer for 
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every item of the package. Now that there 
are great online intermediation and product 
comparison platforms, this is easy to achieve 
as far as technology is concerned. In this sense, 
unbundling can be interpreted as taking the 
standardisation strategy one step further.
summaRy
We have described the situation of consumer 
protection in insurance in Hungary today. We 
believe that after various attempts, consumer 
protection in Hungary has gotten quite far, 
there have been several measures that came 
ahead of international trends and solutions, 
and Hungary has set an example for other 
countries as well – even though the insurance 
market in Hungary is not a big one, it is a 
medium-developed market. 
However, we cannot stop here, we should 
keep moving forward. Moreover, we have be-
come increasingly aware of the theoretical ba-
sis of our actions, and scientific advancement 
– especially in behavioural economics – has 
provided more space and opportunities for 
this. 
The tools of insurance consumer protection 
in Hungary have been refined gradually, and 
this process reveals an increasingly deep un-
derstanding of this field, yet this knowledge 
has not been organised theoretically, there has 
been a lack of theoretical reflection on the sub-
ject – with this study, we intended to contrib-
ute to this. 
In addition to trends in economics, suffi-
cient attention needs to be paid to interna-
tional market practices and legal frameworks, 
and the consumer protection recommenda-
tions of EIoPA need to be transposed. In our 
paper we described how the (single) Eu reg-
ulation was evolving parallel to member state 
regulations, and how Hungarian regulations 
were even ahead of this process sometimes. 
Now these are not separated, the two comple-
ment and support each other – on different 
levels and at different depths – in protecting 
the consumers.
However, it might be an important finding 
that certain international trends in consumer 
protection (e.g. financial literacy), while pro-
moting consumer protection, may help di-
vert attention from key issues, so what seems 
to be the trendiest is not always the best solu-
tion as there are very strong, conflicting inter-
ests in this field. This is why it is essential to 
explore these conflicts of interests in detail and 
to resolve them systematically, in a way that is 
beneficial to the consumers (in the long term). 
Dealing with conflicts of interests may set out 
new directions, directions we are only testing 
now and which can radically change the in-
dustry in the medium term.
Naturally, consumer protection will not 
necessarily be the factor or the only factor fuel-
ling these changes, as the great digital transfor-
mation that affects financial industries (as well) 
is in progress, and it might radically change 
stakeholders, solutions and problems which 
have not really been discussed in our study.
Taking all this into consideration, we be-
lieve financial consumer protection still has a 
long way to go, as consumers need to be pro-
tected from the side of the law and also from 
the side of economics, and the tools of this are 
not always the same as the tools of the govern-
ment. The consumer protection activities of 
civil society organisations and interest groups 
are becoming increasingly important, but this 
is something to discuss in another article.
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Notes
1 The authors would like to thank Károly Szász, 
the former President of the Hungarian Financial 
supervisory Authority (Pénzügyi szervezetek Ál-
lami Felügyelete, hereinafter: PsZÁF) and József 
Zavodnyik, Head of consumer Protection at the 
state Insurance supervisory Authority (Állami Biz-
tosításfelügyelet, hereinafter: ÁBIF) and earlier at 
PsZÁF for their valuable comments and help. The 
authors were involved professionally in insurance 
consumer protection in Hungary for years. Pet-
ra Turi was a legal counsel at the Department 
of consumer Protection at PsZÁF then at the 
central Bank of Hungary, Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
(hereinafter: MNB). Economist József Banyár, 
as senior adviser to the former President of the 
PsZÁF for insurance (with some interruptions, 
for over a decade), had the opportunity to put 
several of his consumer protection ideas into 
practice. Both authors represented Hungary in 
international and European union committees 
for extended periods, which provided them with 
an international insight into the development of 
regulations regarding consumer protection.
2 In Hungary, the role of non-state entities in 
insurance consumer protection is not yet significant, 
so we will not discuss them here, even though we 
consider this an important aspect of the issue. The 
INDRA Biztosítottak és Pénzintézeti Ügyfelek 
országos Érdekvédő Egyesülete, the association 
representing the interests of insured persons and of 
the clients of financial institutions was established 
in the early 1990s, and it was granted support by 
the PsZÁF and the MNB several times. Its website 
(www.indrabizt.hu), however, is not available. It 
seems that consumer protection organisations in 
other areas of finance also rely mostly on support 
from supervisory authorities, e.g. the MNB, and 
they have more or less been integrated into the 
consumer protection system of the MNB through 
the Financial Advisory office Network (Pénzügyi 
Navigátor Tanácsadó Irodahálózat, https://www.
mnb.hu/fogyasztovedelem/tanacsado-irodak), 
which is currently run by the MNB through its 
NGo partners. 
3 The book is a remarkable piece of work on this 
topic, as it tries – but we believe it fails – to provide 
a sort of general theory of consumer protection. 
To this end, as they say, the authors ‘go beyond’ 
the findings of behavioural economics to date, but 
the framework they create, though interesting, is 
not really revelatory – this is an opinion several 
critics share and even the authors quote.
4 Information asymmetry occurs when in a 
transaction one of the parties has significantly 
more or more comprehensive information than 
the other party.
5 The structure was created according to the 
following legal regulations: Act LXIX of 1991 on 
Financial Institutions and Financial Activities, 
Act VI of 1990 on the Public offering of and 
Trading in certain securities and on the stock 
Exchange, Decree of the council of Ministers No. 
56/1986 (XII. 10.) on the state supervision of 
Insurance Activities and Act cXIV of 1996 on the 
state Financial and capital Market supervisory 
commission.
6 The FsA, which politicians thought were 
responsible for the crisis, was abolished by the Fi-
nancial services Act of 19 December 2012, which 
came into force on 1 April 2013. Instead of the 
FsA, by splitting up its structure, the independent 
Financial conduct Authority and the Prudential 
Regulation Authority were created. The latter 
operates under the Bank of England.
7 For more details see Nagy, csiszár (2016)
8 For more details see the chapter on insurance of 
Act IV of 1959 on the civil code.
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9 Limping obligation: Derogation is only permitted 
by law in one direction, for the benefit of one 
party. 
10 see section 157 of Act LXXXVIII of 2014 on the 
Business of Insurance (hereinafter: old Insurance 
Act) .
11 A different type of register, however, which was 
recommended following a similar train of thought 
by the European Insurance and occupational 
Pensions Authority [hereinafter: EIoPA, EIoPA 
(2013)], and which has not yet been introduced 
in Hungary, can actually help insurance clients. 
This would be a register of existing life insurance 
policies, which would help heirs to find life 
insurance policies that their deceased relatives had 
forgotten to mention. on this topic, see Banyár, 
Nagy (2015).
12 see Resolution No. Vj-51-/2005/184 (Hungarian 
competition Authority, 2005).
13 For the differences between cost indicators and 
about potential cost indicators for investment 
funds and life insurances in general, their problems 
and connections, see Banyár (2015).
14 MABIsZ still uses this and is proud of it: In an 
interview in early 2019, the secretary General 
laid special emphasis on this solution (Molnos, 
2019). The MNB also builds on this standard 
product sheet, as it announced in early 2019 
that the second certified consumer-friendly 
product where the expectations of the MNB will 
be built on this standard product sheet will be 
home insurance (after home loans) (see https://
minositetthitel.mnb.hu/). (oral communication 
szebelédi, 2019)
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